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Introduction
The term “memory misinformation effect” refers 
to decreased accuracy of memory reports resulting from 
exposing witnesses to inconsistent information about the 
witnessed event. It is usually studied within a three-stage 
framework (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), in which 
participants are exposed to an original event (e.g. a video 
clip). Afterwards, the postevent information is presented, 
e.g. in the form of a text, which in the experimental group 
contains some details that are inconsistent with the original 
event. Finally, participants are tested for their memory of the 
original event. Typically, the accuracy of memory reports of 
misled participants is lower than those from the non-misled 
control group (see Pickrell, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004; 
Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2006 for reviews). 
Many theories that aim to explain the mechanisms of 
the misinformation effect have been proposed. According 
to one of the earliest explanations, it results from the 
constructive nature of human memory (Loftus, 1975): 
external information may alter the representation of the 
original event. The resulting memory trace is based on both 
original and external information and thus the memory 
report may be distorted. 
A more contemporary and widely accepted theory of 
the misinformation effect is based on the source monitoring 
idea. This posits that misled participants misidentify the 
source of the memory of the suggested detail, erroneously 
ascribing it to the original material (Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane; 1994). In other words, 
participants may correctly remember something but do not 
realize that their memory originates from the postevent, 
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not the original material. In most research, the finding 
that many participants fail to correctly monitor the source 
of information in the misinformation paradigm has been 
confirmed (e.g. Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Belli, Lindsay, 
Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Lindsay, 1990; Mitchell & 
Zaragoza, 1996, 2001; Niedźwieńska, 2002). However, 
some research has failed to replicate it (e.g. Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989; Multhaup, de Leonardis, & Johnson, 1999; 
Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) 
(see Lindsay, 2008 for a review).
A number of other theories of the misinformation 
effect have been proposed, including the parallel traces 
theory (Bekerian & Bowers; 1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 
1984), the CHARM model (Metcalfe, 1990); the fuzzy-
trace theory (Titcomb & Reyna, 1995); activation-based 
framework (Ayers & Reder, 1998) and retrieval-induced 
forgetting (Saunders & MacLeod; 2002). 
All the aforementioned theories share one fundamental 
assumption: the misinformation effect mechanism is based 
on cognitive processes related to memory and involves 
some memory functioning failure, be it encoding, storage, 
or the retrieval phase of the memory process. In contrast, 
few researchers have tried to explain the misinformation 
effect without referring to distortions of memory. However, 
their contributions seem extremely important for our 
understanding of the very reasons why many eyewitnesses 
rely on external misinformation while providing memory 
reports. Firstly, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) made 
a strong theoretical and empirical case for the thesis that 
the misinformation effect may occur even if postevent 
information does not have any effect on participants’ 
ability to remember the original information. To explain 
the fact that some subjects answer in accordance with the 
misleading information, it is enough to assume that some 
subjects did not encode the original information at all, but 
remembered the postevent material and – not realizing that 
it contained misinformation – relied on it while answering 
questions about the original material. Secondly, it is 
possible that other subjects remembered both the original 
and postevent information, and selected the latter because 
they trusted the experimenter’s narrative more than their 
own memory.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) presented a series 
of experiments based on a paradigm in which, in the 
critical question, they choose between the original 
alternative and a new one. Fox example, if the original 
detail was “hammer”, the misleading one “screwdriver”, 
then in the final test the participants choose between 
“hammer” and “wrench”, not between “hammer” and 
“screwdriver”. McCloskey and Zaragoza pointed that if 
it is true that reading about a screwdriver has a negative 
impact on the memory of “hammer”, then in the modified 
procedure misled subjects should less often pick the 
correct alternative (the hammer) than non-misled ones. 
As this was not the case, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) 
concluded that there is no evidence for the negative 
influence of misinformation on the memory of the original 
information, and the results obtained in previous research, 
especially those found by means of procedures in which 
the participants chose between the original and misled 
alternatives, should be interpreted without referring to 
memory processes. 
Other research which clearly showed that it is 
possible that some subjects give answers consistent with 
misinformation, even when realizing that it is contradictory 
with the original information, was presented by Blank 
(1998). He proposed an “Integrative model of memory 
and performance in interference situations” (Blank, 
2005) in which he showed that subjects taking part in an 
experiment on the misinformation effect actually face 
a problem-solving task in which many of them have to find 
a solution for perceived discrepancies between parts of 
the experiment. In the first experiment presented by Blank 
(1998), the subjects, after being exposed to the original and 
postevent materials, were given a forced-choice memory 
test in which they had to choose between the original and 
suggested false alternative. Half the participants were made 
aware of the possible discrepancies before the memory 
test, the other half were not. Afterwards, they were again 
given the questions they had just answered, and were 
requested to indicate any discrepancies they had noticed 
and to describe everything they were thinking about them. 
In sum, Blank (1998) found that in up to 50% of cases the 
participants detected discrepancies between the original 
and postevent materials. Moreover, Blank found that the 
non-warned subjects who detected discrepancies gave 
an answer consistent with misinformation in over 40% 
of cases. Further analyses showed that the main reason 
for this behavior was that participants doubted their own 
memory. The finding that trusting one’s memory may be 
an important predictor of accepting misinformation was 
confirmed by van Bergen, Horselenberg, Merckelbach, 
Jelicic and Beckers (2010).
The results obtained by Blank (1998) seem an 
important breakthrough in the research on the mechanisms 
of the misinformation effect, as it was the first empirical 
demonstration of participants who rely on the postevent 
material in spite of its perceived incongruences with 
the original material. It is surprising that this interesting 
direction, i.e. exploring the non-memory-based mechanisms 
of yielding to misinformation, has been largely ignored.
In the light of this, the main aim of the research 
presented in this article is to replicate and extend the 
findings of Blank (1998): to demonstrate that it is possible 
that a participant correctly remembers what was in the 
original and postevent material, yet, when asked about 
the original material, gives an answer consistent with 
the postevent one. Theories of memory are of little use in 
explaining the behavior of such participants, because the 
memory works correctly in this case. Approaches rooted in 
social psychology, especially in the psychology of influence 
and compliance may be more useful. 
On the other hand, it is also hypothesized that 
subjects aware of discrepancies would be less willing 
to accept misinformation than those not aware of them. 
This is in accordance with the discrepancy detection 
theory (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986), which posits 
that discrepancy detection reduces the misinformation 
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effect. However, for the present research it is important 
to hypothesize that detecting discrepancies by no means 
prevents the misinformation effect from occurring.
Apart from demonstrating the existence of subjects 
yielding to misinformation in spite of knowing the correct 
answer, the second main aim of the presented research 
is to explore the effects of warning and the effects of the 
distinctiveness of the original detail. Both these factors 
seem to be strictly related to the problem of detecting 
discrepancies between the original and postevent 
materials. The research on warning concerns the problem 
of immunizing eyewitnesses against misinformation. This 
is an important problem in applied forensic psychology, 
as misinformation may seriously distort eyewitness 
testimonies, obviously with serious consequences. 
Warning consists of informing participants about possible 
discrepancies between the original and postevent materials 
before the final memory test. Research in this area has 
produced mixed results, from a total elimination of the 
misinformation effect (Blank, 1998, 2005; Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989), through reduction (Greene, Flynn, 
& Loftus, 1982), to a complete lack of the efficacy of 
warning (Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, & Toglia, 2001; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Excellent reviews of research 
concerning the impact of warning on the misinformation 
effect were presented by Oeberst and Blank (2012) and 
Blank and Launay (2014).
This article contains the hypothesis that the 
effectiveness of warning depends largely on discrepancy 
detection. Put simply, if the subject knows that something 
was different between a film he/she saw and the narrative, 
and is warned against these discrepancies before the 
final test, he/she has no more reason to rely on the 
postevent material. The warning provides adequate and 
sufficient explanation for the discrepancies. In contrast, 
when the participant does not know what was different 
in the film and the narrative, he/she also does not know 
what to be wary of, and the warning should be less 
effective.
As for the distinctiveness of the original detail, 
this is an important problem per se in research on the 
misinformation effect. It is now well established that the 
more visible, vivid, and central the critical item, the more 
difficult it is to mislead the participants about it (Dalton & 
Daneman, 2006; Heath & Erickson, 1998; Loftus, 1979; 
Roebers & McConkey, 2003; Roebers & Schneider, 2000; 
Wright & Stroud, 1998). This problem has raised a heated 
discussion, because in everyday life and in the context of 
forensic testimony, the information reported by eyewitness 
is rarely very peripheral and trivial. As in laboratory 
experiments, the critical items are usually peripheral 
and not very visible; therefore, a question about the 
generalizability of the research on the misinformation effect 
and even of the general laboratory research on eyewitness 
testimony arises (see Flowe, Finklea, & Ebbesen, 2009). 
In the context of the research presented in this article, the 
distinctiveness of the critical item is important because it 
may impact discrepancy detection. A hypothesis is stated 
that the more visible and central a critical item in the 
original material, the more subjects will detect that it was 
inconsistently described in the postevent material compared 
to the original one. It follows that the more central an item, 
the more effective the warning about it would be (because 
the efficacy of warning depends on the discrepancy 
detection, which in turn depends on the visibility of the 
critical item). 
The third aim of the present research was to explore 
possible individual differences between participants aware 
of discrepancies yielding to misinformation and those 
also aware of discrepancies, but resisting misinformation. 
Assuming that there would be subjects who correctly 
detected the discrepancies between the original and 
postevent materials, and assuming that some of them 
would give an answer consistent with misinformation, 
while others would correctly respond in accordance 
with the original material, an interesting question arises: 
what are the differences between these two groups of 
subjects. In other words, why do some participants yield 
to the misinformation, even when they remember the 
correct answer, while others do not? The hypothesis 
examined in the present research stated that these two 
types of participant would differ on influenceability, 
suggestibility, compliance, and need for closure. Need for 
closure (Webster & Kruglansky, 1994) is defined as an 
individual’s desire to come to a quick closure in decisions 
a(nd judgments, and an aversion towards ambiguity 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). In cases of doubt, people 
with high need for closure should be more willing to rely on 
external sources of information which can be considered as 
providing true information, such as the narrative prepared 
and provided by the experimenter.
To sum up, the following hypotheses will be tested:
1. The misinformation effect was expected, that is, the 
participants from the misled group would provide 
answers consistent with misinformation more 
often than those from the non-misled control group 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 3)
2. Participants who correctly detected discrepancies 
will less often answer in accordance with the 
misinformation in the memory test about the 
original material than those who did not detect them 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 3).
3. Some participants will be aware that there were 
discrepancies between the original and postevent 
materials as regards the critical answer, and will 
give an answer consistent with the postevent 
material. Depending on the procedure, this 
hypothesis may be stated even more strongly: 
There will be subjects who correctly remembered 
a critical item from the film and from the postevent 
material, yet give an answer consistent with the 
latter (Experiments 1, 2, and 3).
4. In the case of central critical misled items, more 
subjects will correctly detect that they are incongruent 
with the postevent material than in the case of 
peripheral ones (Experiments 2 and 3).
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5. In the case of central critical misled items, less 
subjects will give an answer consistent with 
misinformation than in the case of peripheral items 
(Experiments 2 and 3).
6. The warning against inconsistencies between the 
original and postevent materials will be more effective 
in the group of participants who discovered the 
discrepancies regarding the critical item than in the 
group who did not (Experiments 2 and 3).
7. The main reason for giving an answer consistent with 
the postevent material even when the memory for the 
original item is correct will be participants’ doubt in 
their own quality of memory (Experiment 2).
8. In the group of participants aware of discrepancies, 
the subgroup who in the memory test answered 
in accordance to misinformation will have higher 
results on measures of influenceability, suggestibility, 





Students of various universities in Kraków, Poland, 
took part in the experiment (N = 424, 377 women, 45 men, 
two subjects did not indicate their gender). The mean 
age of the sample was 20.5 years (SD = 1.6). Most of 
the participants were unpaid volunteers; some received 
university credit points for their participation. 
The most important hypotheses referred to the 
misled subjects. It was assumed that they would split into 
groups that were aware and unaware of the discrepancies 
between the original and postevent materials, and each 
group would further split according to whether subjects 
were yielding or unyielding to misinformation. Therefore, 
a large group of misled subjects was included (n = 407), 
and only a small control non-misled group (n = 17), which 
only served to confirm that the misinformation effect, was 
present at all.
Materials
A video clip of about 4 minutes’ duration showing 
a robbery of a jeweler shop committed by two men and 
a woman.
The postevent material – a narrative (140 words) 
summarizing the video. The critical misled item was the 
color of a car that was yellow in the video and red in the text.
The memory test comprised eight open-ended 
questions about the video clip. The critical question was 
“What was the color of the car which hit the other car at the 
moment of the explosion?” 
The discrepancy detection test comprised the same 
eight questions, with two YES options, meaning that the 
participants detected discrepancies between the video 
and the information in the narrative, and NO, meaning no 
discrepancies were detected.
Questionnaires
Measure of Susceptibility to Social Influence (MSSI; 
Bobier, 2002; Polish adaptation: Polczyk, 2007). This is 
a 34-item tool designed to assess three possible responses 
to social influence pressure: independence (Principled 
Autonomy), conformity/compliance (Social Adaptability), 
and anticonformity (Social Friction). The questions 
are answered on a 5-point Likert scale, from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”. Cronbach’s alphas for the 
three dimensions were .80, .82, and .67, respectively.
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS, Gudjonsson, 
1989, 1997; Polish adaptation: Wilk, 2004) was designed to 
measure compliance, defined as the tendency to conform to 
requests made by others, particularly people in authority, in 
order to please them or to avoid conflict and confrontation. 
It consists of 20 statements answered true or false, e.g. 
“I give in easily when I am pressured”. The reliability of 
this tool in the present research was .80.
Inventory of Suggestibility (IS, González-Ordi & 
Miguel-Tobal, 1999; Polish translation: Pasek, unpublished 
manuscript) is a self-report assessment of suggestibility. It 
provides a measure of yielding to suggestive influence. As 
the factor structure reported by González-Ordi & Miguel-
Tobal (1999) did not replicate in Polish research, the factor 
solution reported by Polczyk (2007) was used, consisting 
of four factors: Absorption – the tendency to immerse in 
dreaming and fantasy; Suggestibility – the tendency to yield 
to influence; Emotional Involvement – the tendency to 
respond to emotional stimuli; Concentration – the ability to 
ignore stimuli unrelated to current activity. The respective 
reliabilities were .76, .78, .53, and .51. 
Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglansky, 1994; 
Polish adaptation: Kossowska, 2003) is a questionnaire 
measuring the need for cognitive closure, defined as an 
individual’s desire to come to a quick closure in decisions 
and judgments, and an aversion towards ambiguity 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). A shortened 32-item 
version with a 6-point Likert scale as the answers was used 
which measures five domains: (1) preference for order and 
structure, (2) predictability of future, (3) decisiveness of 
judgments and choices, (4) affective discomfort caused by 
ambiguity, and (5) closed-mindedness. The reliabilities for 
the five dimensions in the present research, as indicated by 
Cronbach’s alphas, were .80, .78, .58, .29, and .68. Thus, 
the reliability for decisiveness and affective discomfort 
are somewhat lower and the respective results should 
be treated with caution. The reliability for the whole 
scale was .80.
Procedure
The experiment was run in groups from 3 to about 
20 participants, always in a room equipped with a video 
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projector and a screen. The experimenter announced that 
the experiment was about information processing and 
instructed the participants to watch to video clip carefully. 
A video was then presented. The participants were then 
given all the questionnaires and began to complete them 
in a random order. After 7 minutes, the experimenter told 
the participants to stop filling out the questionnaires and 
to read the postevent narrative. Afterwards, the subjects 
continued to fill out questionnaires for another 7 minutes 
and were given the memory test. Immediately after this, the 
experimenter took away the memory test and distributed 
the discrepancy detection questionnaire, with the following 
instruction:
“Listen carefully now so you understand what is 
expected from you now. Some details in the text you have 
read were in fact different than they were in the video. 
You will now be given the same questions you have just 
answered. Your task now is to indicate each question in 
which you noticed inconsistencies between the video you 
watched and the text you read”. The task was illustrated 
with an example. After the participants finished this part 
of the experiment, they were given time to finish the 
questionnaires.
Results
In the misled group, 123 out of 407 (30.2%), when 
asked about the video, answered the critical question 
in accordance with the misinformation, whereas 
among the 17 non-misled ones, only one did so (chi2 
(1, N = 424) = 4.67, p = .031; Fisher exact test: p = .030, 
phi = .11, odds ratio with 95% confidence intervals 
(OR) = 6.93 [0.91, -42.83]. Thus, hypothesis 1, which 
postulates the misinformation effect, was confirmed.
From the 407 misled subjects, 248 (60.9%) correctly 
indicated the critical item (yellow vs. red car). The 
remaining 159 participants (39.1%) were not aware of 
the discrepancies between the video and the narrative 
concerning the critical item.
To test hypothesis 2, the number of answers consistent 
with misinformation was compared between subjects who 
did and did not detect the discrepancy between the video and 
the narrative as regards the critical item. The results indicated 
that out of 248 participants who detected the discrepancy, 
24.2% yielded to misinformation, whereas out of the 159 
who did not notice it, 45.3% gave an answer consistent 
with the misinformation. The difference was statistically 
significant (chi2 (1, N = 407) = 19.66, p < .001; Fisher exact 
test: p < .001, phi = .22, OR = .39 (.25–.59). This means that 
detecting discrepancies reduces the tendency to yield to 
misinformation. However, for the main hypothesis 3 tested 
in this experiment, it is important that almost one quarter of 
those subjects who were aware of the critical discrepancy 
still gave an answer consistent with the misinformation. This 
confirms the hypothesis that it is possible to correctly detect 
discrepancies and still yield to misinformation.
From the participants who correctly detected the criti-
cal discrepancy, about a quarter yielded to misinformation, 
and three quarters resisted it. The next analysis explored 
whether these two groups of participants differ regarding 
various indices of susceptibility to social influence. The 
results, obtained by means of Student t tests, are presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Differences between participants who yielded and resisted the misinformation, in the group who correctly 
detected discrepancies - means, standard deviations, and Student t tests (Experiment 1)
Questionnaire Subscale Yielded Resisted t df1 eta2 p
Measure of Susceptibility 
to Social Influence
Principled autonomy 52.30 (6.47) 54.15 (7.80) 1.48 212 .01 .142
Social adaptability 33.00 (7.15) 32.05 (7.11) -.82 220 <.01 .412
Social friction 24.69 (4.52) 25.02 (4.55) .44 218 <.01 .661
Need for Closure
Preference for order 29.27 (5.80) 28.84 (5.39) -.48 213 <.01 .631
Predictability  of  future 30.67 (7.04) 29.55 (5.73) -1.13 216 .01 .261
Decisiveness 16.84 (4.28) 17.87 (4.44) 1.45 216 .01 .149
Discomfort with ambiguity 25.86 (3.48) 25.76 (3.90) -.16 219 <.01 .870
Closed-mindedness 18.06 (3.05) 18.55 (2.82) 1.06 215 .01 .291
General score 119.93 (15.97) 119.98 (12.33) .02 195 <.01 .983
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale General score 7.94 (3.83) 7.20 (4.00) -1.14 219 .01 .254
Inventory of 
suggestibility
Absorption 15.24 (4.82) 14.82 (4.94) -.54 216 <.01 .592
Suggestibility 16.91 (4.04) 16.04 (4.30) -1.25 214 .01 .214
Emotional involvement 7.57 (2.73) 7.88 (2.45) .77 218 <.01 .445
Concentration 8.59 (1.71) 8.48 (1.79) -.38 219 <.01 .704
1 The variation in the number of dfs is caused by subjects who failed to fill out some tests.
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The comparison between participants yielding to 
and resisting misinformation produced no statistically 
significant effects. Thus, hypothesis 8 was not confirmed.
Discussion
The misinformation effect was demonstrated in this 
experiment, despite the fact that the control group only 
comprised 17 subjects. This confirms good replicability of 
this effect.
The successful discrepancy detection reduced 
the vulnerability to misinformation, thus confirming 
hypothesis 2. This means that misinformation may 
be particularly dangerous when the witness does not 
realize that an additional source provides information 
that is inconsistent with what has actually happened. 
It is possible that a sort of filling of memory gaps takes 
place here. If the participant answered in accordance 
with the misinformation, he/she must have encoded and 
remembered it, because the questions in the memory 
test were open-ended, thus practically reducing correct 
guessing to a trivial level. If he/she does not remember the 
relevant information from the original source, meaning 
no discrepancy detection can take place, he/she simply 
assumes that the information from the additional source of 
information is correct. It seems that eyewitnesses in real 
life should be warned and instructed to rely only on their 
own memory, and not report information that they know 
stems from any source other than their own memory. This 
of course assumes that eyewitnesses are able to monitor the 
source of their information correctly, which certainly is not 
always true.
In sum, 60.9% of misled subjects were able to detect 
the critical discrepancy correctly. Of central importance 
to the theses researched in the present article is the fact 
that 24.2% of them gave an answer consistent with 
misinformation. Giving that the level of guessing in open-
ended questions is trivial, this means that a substantial 
proportion of aware participants made a wrong decision 
when deciding whether their memory for the original 
material was right or wrong. Therefore, the main 
hypothesis 3 was confirmed in this experiment. 
The next analysis concerned the participants who 
were proved to have detected the discrepancy between the 
original and postevent materials. Among those, some gave 
an answer consistent with misinformation, while some 
did not. Both these groups were compared by means of 
a battery of tests measuring various aspects of influence, 
compliance, and need for closure. No difference was 
statistically significant. Although it is difficult to reject 
the hypothesis on the basis of nonsignificant results, 
this may nevertheless suggest that the hypothesized 





In this experiment, 325 participants were tested: 
260 women and 64 men (one participant did not indicate 
gender), with a mean age of 21.1 years (SD = 4.3). 
The participants were students of various universities 
in Kraków, Poland, including first year students of 
psychology. Some subjects participated for credit points; 
others were unpaid volunteers.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were essentially the 
same as in Experiment 1, with the following modifications 
introduced to test hypotheses 4, 5, and 6:
Centrality vs. periphery of the critical item: To verify 
hypotheses 4 and 5, two critical items were used which 
differed in their distinctiveness. The more central item was 
the same as in Experiment 1: the color of the car, which 
was yellow in the video and red in the narrative. The more 
peripheral item was the time visible on a street clock, which 
showed 8:55am in the video and 2:55pm in the narrative. 
About half of the subjects received the postevent material 
with the misinformation referring to the red color as the 
critical item, the other half received misinformation about 
the hour. The color proved to be more central and visible 
than the hour in other research (Polczyk, 2007).
Warning: To test hypothesis 6, about half of the partic-
ipants received the following warning: “ATTENTION: the 
narrative you have read might have contained some infor-
mation which was incongruent with what really happened 
in the video clip. While answering the following questions, 
you should only rely on information remembered from the 
video”. The warning was written at the top of the answer 
sheet containing the questions about the video.
Processing of discrepancies: The aim of this tool was 
to gain some information about the cognitive processes 
of participants coping with the perceived discrepancies 
between the film and the text. The participants had 
to indicate one or more options about what they were 
thinking about the reasons for the discrepancies between 
the narrative and the video. The following reasons 
were offered to choose from: doubting own memory, 
a mistake by the experimenter, a deliberate method of 
the experimenter, a deception by the experimenter, and 
being sure about own memory (this referred to subjects 
who did not yield to misinformation in the previous 
memory test). The ideas were copied from the results 
obtained in similar research by Blank (1998). In contrast 
to Blank (1998), who asked his participants to write down 
what they were thinking, in the present research a set of 
options was provided. However, the subjects also had 
a chance to write down their own thoughts. This part of 
the procedure took place immediately after the discrepancy 
detection test.
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Table 3. Number and percentages of subjects yielding to misinformation as a function of warning and disrepancy 




Total chi2 phi OR (95% CI) p Fisher exact p Warned Non-warned
Yes 13 (15.1) (86) 31 (40.8) (76) 44 (27.2) (162) 13.44 .29 .26 (.12–.55) <.001 <.001
No 20 (32.8) (61) 63 (61.8) (102) 83 (50.9) (163) 12.83 .28 .30 (.15–.59) <.001 <.001
Table 4. Processing of disrepancies - subject ideas about the reasons for discrepancies  - numbers, percentages, 






n = 60 chi
2 phi OR (95% CI) p Fisher exact p
Non-warned
Doubting own 
memory 17 (73.9) 27 (73.0) 44 (73.3) <.01 .01 1.02 (.65–1.59) .936 .999
Mistake of the 
experimenter 2 (8.7) 7 (18.9) 9 (15.0) 1.16 .14 2.45 (.46–12.98) .281 .460
Method of the 
experimenter 11 (47.8) 25 (67.6) 36 (60.0) 2.30 .20 2.27 (.78–6.62) .129 .177
Deception 5 (21.7) 15 (40.5) 20 (33.3) 2.26 .19 2.45 (.75–8.06) .133 .166
Sure about own 






n = 86 chi
2 phi OR (95% CI) p Fisher exact p
Warned
Doubting own 
memory 13 (100.0) 49 (67.1) 62 (72.1) 5.93 .26 1.27 (1.11–1.44) .015 .016
Mistake of the 
experimenter 1 (7.7) 8 (11.0) 9 (10.5) .13 .04 1.48 (.17–12.91) .723 .999
Method of the 
experimenter 3 (23.1) 44 (60.3) 47 (54.7) 6.16 .27 5.06 (1.28–19.96) .013 .017
Deception 2 (15.4) 43 (58.9) 54 (52.3) 8.38 .31 7.88 (1.63–38.16) .004 .005
Sure about own 
memory 2 (15.4) 25 (34.2) 27 (31.4) 1.82 .15 2.86 (.59–13.94) .177 .214
Table 2. The impact of the vividness of the critical item on yielding to misinformation and on discrepancy detection 
(non-warned participants only; n = 178; df = 1) - numbers, percentages, and the chi2 tests (Experiment 2)
Vividness of the detail
Total
(n = 178) chi




Yielding to misinformation 27 (38.6) 67 (62.0) 94 (52.8) 9.38 .23  .38 (.21–.71) .002 .003
Discrepancy detection 40 (57.1) 36 (33.3) 76 (42.7) 9.84 .24 2.67 (1.44–4.96) .002 .002
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Results
To test the misinformation effect, two analyses were 
performed. In the first, answers to the question about 
the color of the car were compared between subjects 
misled as to the color of the car and the hour, the latter 
group serving as the non-misled control group. Next, the 
answers to the question about the hour were also compared 
between subjects misled about the color of the car and 
the hour, the former serving as the non-misled control 
group. Both analyses confirmed the misinformation effect: 
24.4% vs. 3.4% of answers consistent with misinformation 
(chi2 (1, N = 325) = 28.13, p < .001, Fisher exact test: 
p < .001, phi = .29, OR = 9.19 (3.54–23.86); and 50.3% vs. 
0.6% (just one person), (chi2 (1, N = 325) = 113.47, p < .001, 
Fisher exact test: p < .001, phi = .59, OR = .01 (.01–.04).
To analyze hypotheses 2 and 3, the number of 
answers consistent with misinformation was compared 
between subjects who did and did not correctly detect 
the discrepancy between the video and the narrative. This 
analysis was done in the non-warned group only. 56.5% 
of participants detected the discrepancy, 41.5% did not. 
Among the former, 13 (15.1%) gave an answer consistent 
with the misinformation. This confirmed the main 
hypothesis 3.
Out of the 61 participants who did not detect the 
discrepancy, 32.8% yielded to misinformation. The 
difference between this percentage and the one from the 
group who did detect the discrepancy was statistically 
significant (chi2 1, N = 147) = 6.40, p = .011, Fisher 
exact test: p = .016, phi = .21, OR = .37 (.16–.81). Thus, 
hypothesis 2 was confirmed.
The next analysis verified whether details that were 
more distinct than less visible ones produced a lesser 
misinformation effect and better discrepancy detection. The 
results are presented in Table 2.
As is clear from Table 2, less subjects gave answers 
consistent with misinformation in the case of the more 
distinct (visible) item than in the case of the less distinct 
one. In contrast, in the case of the more distinct item, more 
participants correctly detected discrepancies than in the 
case of the less visible one. Thus, hypotheses 4 and 5 were 
confirmed.
Next, the effects of warning on the misinformation 
effect were analyzed. The analysis took into account 
discrepancy detection. The results are presented in 
Table 3.
Table 3 clearly indicates that the warning was 
effective both in groups that did and did not detect 
discrepancies, reducing the number of answers consistent 
with misinformation from 40.8% to 15.1% and from 61.8% 
to 32.8%, respectively. For hypothesis 6, of particular 
value is the interaction between warning and detecting 
discrepancies. As indicated by Table 3, over twice as many 
warned subjects yielded to misinformation when they 
were not aware of the discrepancies than when they were 
aware of them (32.8% vs. 15.1%). This difference was 
statistically significant (chi2 1, N = 147) = 6.41, p = .011; 
Fisher exact test: p = .016, phi = .21, OR = .37 (.15–.87). 
Thus, hypothesis 6, which states that warning is more 
efficient when the participant realizes that there was 
a difference between the video and in the narrative, was 
confirmed.
The next analysis concerned cognitive processing 
of the discrepancies. This consisted of the participants 
indicating their perceived reasons for the discrepancies 
(Table 4). 
In the non-warned sample, about three quarters of 
the subjects selected the option “doubting own memory”. 
Surprisingly, both the group that yielded to misinformation 
and the one that resisted it chose this reason equally 
often. 
The situation was interpreted as being a mistake by the 
experimenter by 15% of participants. Sixty percent thought 
that the discrepancy must be part of the experiment. One 
third believed that it was a deliberate deception made by 
the experimenter. Finally, about 8% was sure that their 
own memory was right. The frequency of choosing of 
these reasons was not statistically significantly different 
between participants who gave an answer consistent with 
misinformation and those who did not.
The pattern of results was different in the group 
of warned subjects. All subjects who yielded to 
misinformation despite the warning doubted their own 
memory. Among those who resisted the misinformation, 
about two thirds doubted their memory. In sum, the results 
do not appear to support hypothesis 7, stating that the main 
reason for subjects aware of the discrepancies to give an 
answer consistent with misinformation was doubting their 
own memory. If this were true, in the non-warned group 
more subjects yielding to misinformation should doubt their 
memory than subjects resisting misinformation. This was 
not the case.
Surprisingly, about 10% of subjects interpreted the 
situation as the mistake of the experimenter, despite the 
fact that they were warned about the possible discrepancies. 
About 23% of participants yielding to misinformation 
believed the discrepancies resulted from the experimental 
method; among those resistant, 60% believed the same, 
the difference being statistically significant. About 15% 
of participants yielding to misinformation thought that 
the discrepancies were a result of deception; among those 
resisting the misleading suggestion significantly more, 
almost 60%, believed the same. Finally, about one third of 
the warned participants were sure that their own memory 
was right.
The analysis of the open commentaries of the 
participants did not lead to any interpretable results.
Finally, the analysis comparing subjects who 
yielded to misinformation and resisted it was performed 
in the sample of non-warned participants and those 
who were aware of discrepancies. The same battery 
of tests as in Experiment 1 was used. The results are 
presented in Table 5. Similar to Experiment 1, no effects 
were statistically significant and hypothesis 8 was not 
confirmed. 
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Discussion
The misinformation effect was replicated in this 
experiment. This confirms the universality and good 
replicability of this phenomenon.
In Experiment 2, it was confirmed that some 
participants were aware of the discrepancy between the 
original and postevent materials as regards the critical item. 
Furthermore, among the participants who correctly detected 
discrepancies, 15.1% gave an answer consistent with the 
misinformation. This is a percentage somewhat smaller than 
Experiment 1, in which 24.2% of participants aware of the 
discrepancy yielded to misinformation; however, this still 
means that almost one sixth of the participants gave in to 
misinformation in spite of detecting discrepancies correctly. 
Thus, this is the second experimental result that confirms 
that it is not enough for a participant to realize that he saw 
and read something different. Still, it is possible that, when 
asked about what he saw, he answers in accordance with 
what he read. To explain the mechanisms of such behavior, 
the cognitive theories concerning memory may not be 
enough. 
The percentage of answers consistent with mis-
information was greater in the group that was not aware 
of the discrepancy, which confirms the respective result 
from Experiment 1. Still, the misinformation effect was not 
eliminated.
In the case of a vivid and distinct original detail, 
participants were less likely to give answers consistent with 
misinformation than in the case of a less distinct detail. At 
the same time, items that were more visible produced better 
discrepancy detection than less visible ones. Although it 
is difficult to prove directly by means of a path analysis 
(as this would require continuous variables, not categorical 
ones), it is possible that the influence of the vividness of 
the original detail on the possibility to be misled is related 
to the discrepancy detection. The more vivid the original 
detail, the easier the discrepancy detection, which in turn 
reduces the tendency to rely on the additional postevent 
information.
Warning participants against possible discrepancies 
between the original and postevent materials was more 
successful in the case of participants who noticed the 
discrepancies. This confirms the hypothesis that in the case 
of such subjects, the warning is more effective because it 
provides an explanation of the differences between parts 
of the experiment. Participants who did not notice the 
differences between the video and the narrative could 
not take full advantage of the warning, because it did 
not inform them of which piece of information from the 
narrative they should be wary.
The analysis of the reasons for the discrepancies 
perceived by the subjects produced complicated results. 
Surely, most subjects doubted their own memory when 
they saw discrepancies. However, doubting memory 
seemingly did not affect the responses in the memory test. 
However, one result from this analysis certainly deserves 
attention: over half of the subjects in the warned group and 
about one third in the non-warned group suspected that 
the inconsistencies between the video and the narrative 
were of result of deliberate deception on the part of the 
experimenter. This is a substantial amount, and may raise 
concerns as to what extent and how many subjects correctly 
Table 5. Differences between participants who yielded and resisted the misinformation, in the non-warned group 
who correctly detected discrepancies - means, standard deviations, and Student t tests (Experiment 2)
Questionnarie Subscale Yielded Resisted t df1 eta2 p
Measure of Susceptibility 
to Social Influence
Principled autonomy 57.30 (7.29) 56.93 (9.00) -.17 53 <.01 .869
Social adaptability 30.96 (7.92) 31.50 (9.15) .23 55 <.01 .816
Social friction 25.34 (6.24) 26.42 (5.34) .72 58 .01 .475
Need for Closure
Preference for order 27.97 (6.47) 28.84 (7.28) .50 59 <.01 .622
Predictability  of  future 30.10 (8.62) 28.42 (8.89) -.74 58 .01 .460
Decisiveness 16.68 (4.99) 15.88 (4.50) -.66 58 .01 .514
Discomfort with ambiguity 26.55 (5.06) 25.59 (4.93) -.75 59 .01 .457
Closed-mindedness 18.17 (3.21) 18.82 (3.16) .80 60 .01 .428
General score 119.07 (16.20) 118.90 (18.82) -.04 55 <.01 .970
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale General score 7.61 (3.93) 6.38 (4.04) -1.16 55 .02 .250
Inventory of 
suggestibility
Absorption 16.71 (4.71) 18.06 (5.83) .98 59 .02 .331
Suggestibility 15.57 (5.54) 16.82 (4.93) .93 59 .01 .356
Emotional involvement 8.24 (3.35) 8.03 (2.84) -.27 60 <.01 .789
Concentration 8.97 (2.01) 9.00 (2.08) -.17 53 <.01 .947
1 The variation in the number of dfs is caused by subjects who failed to fill out some tests.
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guessed the real purpose of the study. If many subjects did, 
this may certainly raise some concerns about the external 
validity of the experimental procedure. As Orne (1962) put 
it, the demand characteristics of it may be high; that is, it 
is relatively easy to guess its real purpose. Unsuccessful 
deception in the case of experiments on the misinformation 
effect is dangerous and deserves attention. Certainly, post-
experimental enquiries would be very useful to establish 
to what extent the participants guessed the real purpose of 
the study.
Experiment 2, just as Experiment 1, failed to detect 
any differences concerning individual traits relating to 
influenceability and need for closure between participants 
yielding to misinformation and resisting it (out of those 
who were aware of the discrepancy between the video and 
the narrative). This disappointing result may suggest that 
the reasons why somebody answers incorrectly even if he/
she knows that he saw and read something different are not 
caused by influenceability. Further exploration of individual 
traits that differentiate between subjects relying on their 
own memories and those trusting external information 
seems one of the most interesting directions for future 




487 subjects took part in Experiment 3: 316 women 
and 169 men (two subjects did not indicate their gender), 
with a mean age of 22.6 years (SD = 3.1). The participants 
were students of various universities in Kraków, Poland, 
including first year students of psychology. Some of the 
subjects participated for credit points; others were unpaid 
volunteers.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were similar to those in 
Experiment 2, with the following modifications:
– no processing of discrepancies was applied;
– The discrepancy detection test was modified to 
overcome some limitations of the method used 
by Blank (1998) and in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
limitations lie in the fact that in this procedure the 
researcher does not know the actual content of 
a participant’s memory regarding the critical item. If 
he/she indicated some question as referring to a detail 
that was different in the video and in the text, it is 
still unclear whether the subject actually correctly 
remembered the relevant content of both materials. In 
the present research, the original critical item was the 
yellow color of the car, depicted in the narrative as 
red. It is possible that a subject, when asked about the 
discrepancies, indicated the question “What was the 
color of the car”, but in fact he/she thought that the 
car in the video was, say, green, and in the text, for 
example, blue. 
To overcome this, in Experiment 3 the task of 
participants was not to merely indicate the question if 
they suspected a discrepancy, but to answer a question 
concerning what was in the video and narrative, separately. 
Let us again consider the example with the color of the car 
that was yellow in the video and red in the narrative. After 
the participants read the narrative, they answered questions 
about the video, including the question “What was the color 
of the car?” Immediately afterwards, the participants were 
told that there were discrepancies between the video and 
the narrative. They were then given the same questions, 
including the question about the color of the car. Below 
each question, a space was provided inviting an answer to 
two additional open-ended questions: “What answer would 
follow from the film?”, and “What answer would follow 
from the text?”
This method allows for an exact diagnosis of whether 
a participant indeed correctly remembered what was in the 
video and in the narrative. In the example with the color 
of the car, a participant was only diagnosed as “aware of 
the discrepancies” if he/she provided correct answers: it 
would follow from the film that the car was yellow, and it 
would follow from the text that it was red. If a participant 
only remembered the film, but not the text, or vice versa, or 
did not remember either source, he/she was not considered 
aware of the discrepancies. The task was carefully 
explained to participants and illustrative examples were 
provided.
Results
The misinformation effect was replicated in this 
experiment in the case of both critical details. In the case 
of non-warned subjects and the question about the color of 
the car, an answer consistent with the misinformation was 
given by 54 (45.0%) misled subjects and by two (1.2%) 
non-misled ones. In the case of the question about the 
hour, respective results were 106 (65.8%) vs. one (0.8%). 
Both effects were highly statistically significant: chi2 
1, N = 281) = 82.50, p < .001, Fisher exact test: p < .001, 
phi = .54, OR = .02 (.01–.06); and chi2 1, N = 281) = 123.24, 
p < .001; Fisher exact test: p < .001, phi = .66, OR = 229.35 
(31.20–1686.11), respectively.
Out of the 281 non-warned subjects, 27 (9.6%) 
correctly remembered the content of the video and the 
narrative in the case of the critical items. Of these, four 
(14.8%) gave an answer consistent with the narrative when 
asked about the film. Out of the 254 subjects not diagnosed 
as fully remembering the content of the video and the 
film, 155 (61.0%) yielded to misinformation. Again, the 
hypothesis postulating the existence of subjects who give 
a wrong answer consistent with misinformation in spite 
of their untouched memory for the original and postevent 
materials was confirmed. Of course, the discrepancy 
detection reduced the vulnerability to misinformation 
(chi2 1, N = 281) = 21.21, p < .001, Fisher exact test: 
p < .001, phi = .28, OR = .11 (.04–.33).
As in the previous experiment, the next analysis 
explored the impact of the vividness of the critical item 
on yielding to misinformation. This analysis was done in 
the subsample of non-warned participants. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
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As in Experiment 2, a more visible critical item 
produced a less pronounced misinformation effect and 
a much bigger discrepancy detection.
Next, the effects of warning on the misinformation 
effect were analyzed separately in groups of participants 
who did and did not correctly remember the critical items 
from the video and the narrative (Table 7). 
The results of this analysis indicate that, contrary 
to the hypothesis, the warning was not statistically 
significantly effective in the sample of participants 
correctly remembering the content of the video and the 
narrative when answering questions about the film. In 
contrast, the warning was very effective in the group of 
subjects who were not aware of the discrepancies between 
the original and postevent materials. 
The comparison between subjects giving answers 
consistent with misinformation and the original material 
was not performed in this experiment, because the 
number of participants available in the non-warned group 
who yielded to misinformation while being aware of the 
discrepancies was only four.
Discussion
In Experiment 3, a different method of detecting 
the discrepancies was applied which allowed for direct 
verification of what the subject remembered from the video 
and the narrative about the critical item at the moment of 
answering questions from the memory test. Only subjects 
who remembered the information from the video and the 
text were considered to have detected the discrepancies. 
This seems a better method than just having the subjects 
indicate the questions if they noticed discrepancies between 
the original and postevent materials. In this light, it is worth 
noticing that in Experiment 3 the percentage of participants 
diagnosed as being aware of the discrepancies was 
strikingly lower than in Experiments 1 and 2. It was 9.6% 
in the present experiment, 60.9% in Experiment 1, and 
56.5% in Experiment 2. Given the fact that the materials 
and the procedure were virtually the same, it means that 
apparently different groups were formed using both 
methods. 
To some extent, this may explain the differences 
between the results of Experiments 2 and 3 regarding 
warning. In Experiment 2, it was more effective in the 
group that discovered the differences between materials, 
and less in the group that did not. In Experiment 3, the 
effect of warning was nonsignificant in the group that did 
discover discrepancies, but significant in the group that did 
not. Clearly, more research is needed on the methods of 
identifying subjects who correctly discovered the critical 
inconsistencies between parts of the procedure. The present 
experiments are just the beginning of such research.
With all differences between both procedures, the 
results concerning the main hypotheses were similar (apart 
from those concerning the warning): the misinformation 
effect was replicated, there were participants who 
responded in accordance with the misinformation despite 
the fact that they remembered the correct answer, and more 
visible critical items produced a smaller misinformation 
effect and greater discrepancy detection. 
General discussion
The misinformation effect consists of including in 
memory reports erroneous details that stem from sources 
other than the original information. Since the seminal 
research by Loftus et al. (1978), it has been studied 
mainly by experts in the psychology of memory. This is 
understandable. But in the light of the research by Blank 
(1998), which has been fully replicated and extended in the 
present article, it is possible that at least some subjects yield 
to misinformation for reasons unrelated to memory. The 
framework of the cognitive psychology of memory may not 
be enough to explain the behavior of such participants. The 
Table 6 The impact of the vividness of the critical item on yielding to misinformation and on discrepancy detection 
(non-warned participants only; n = 178; df = 1) – numbers, percentages, and the chi2 tests (Experiment 3)
Vividness of the detail
Total
(n = 281) chi








Yielding to misinformation 54 (45.0) 105 (65.2) 159 (56.6) 11.44 .20  .44 (.27–.71) .001 .001
Discrepancy detection 21 (17.5)  6 (3.7) 27 (9.6) 15.02 .23 5.48 (2.14–14.05) <.001 <.001
Table 7. Number and percentages of subjects yielding to misinformation as a function of warning and discrepancy 




Total chi2 phi OR (95% CI) p Fisher exact p Warned Non-warned
Yes  9 (26.5) (34)   4 (14.8) (27)  13 (21.3) (61)  1.22 .14 2.07 (.56–7.65) .270 .352
No 56 (32.6) (172) 155 (61.0) (254) 211 (49.5) (426) 33.24 .28  .31 (.21–.46) <.001 <.001
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framework of social psychology, especially the psychology 
of social influence, may be more suitable.
The experiments on conformity by Asch (1951) 
come to mind, in which people denied what they saw 
and answered in accordance with obviously wrong 
responses given by members of the group. There are of 
course important differences between conformity and 
misinformation effect frameworks. In the research on 
conformity, the pressure is social in nature as it is exerted 
by a group of people. In the misinformation framework, 
the pressure is just a piece of paper (although in some 
research the misinformation is communicated by other 
people, e.g. Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Szpitalak, Polak, 
Polczyk & Dukała, 2015; Roediger, Mead & Bergman, 
2001; Meade & Roediger, 2002; see also Blank et al., 
2013). The second difference is the fact that in experiments 
on the misinformation effect, participants are usually not 
confronted with a group and do not need to overtly disagree 
with others. With all these differences, the framework of 
conformity may be a place to start finding an explanation of 
the behavior of participants aware of the discrepancies and 
yielding to misinformation. The distinction between public 
conformity and private acceptance (Kiesler & Kiesler, 
1969) is also useful: the misinformation effect seems to be 
more related to private acceptance.
In sum, the results of the three experiments clearly 
indicate that some people who are aware of discrepancies 
yield to misinformation. In addition, less vivid details 
produced a greater misinformation effect and lesser 
discrepancy detection. On the other hand, the results 
concerning the warning were inconclusive. Moreover, 
clearly no individual traits were discovered, which would 
explain why some people aware of the discrepancies chose 
an answer consistent with the truth, while others chose an 
answer consistent with the misinformation. Obviously, 
influenceability, compliance, and need for closure do not 
explain differences between both groups of subjects. 
For future research of this kind, traits connected with 
self-confidence may be the next candidate. The hypothesis 
would be that self-confident people rely on their own 
memory, while those with lower self-confidence rely on 
external sources, and yield to misinfomration more often. 
Results of some research are promising for such an idea. 
For example, induced self-confidence was shown to reduce 
susceptibility to social pressure (MacBride & Tuddenham, 
1965) and to be a predictor of the reliance of oneself as 
a source of information (Barber, 2008). Also, self-confidence 
was proved to reduce to vulnerability to interrogative 
suggestibility, that is, the tendency to yield to misleading 
cues included in the questions, and the tendency to change 
answers after negative feedback (Szpitalak & Polczyk, 2016). 
Most importantly, Szpitalak and Polczyk (2015) were able to 
show that enhanced self-confidence reduced vulnerability 
to misinformation mainly among the participants who were 
aware that there were discrepancies between the original and 
postevent misinformation. Szpitalak and Polczyk (2015) 
argued that enhanced self-confidence caused the participants 
to rely more on their own memories, instead of depending 
on information provided be external sources, but this is 
only possible when the participants are able to distinguish 
between their own knowledge and information stemming 
from external sources.
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